Showing posts with label Greece. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Greece. Show all posts

Sunday, July 08, 2012

Diversified Investment Strategy

Investment markets over the last quarter have been driven primarily by uncertainties with respect to outcomes in resolving the debt crisis in Europe. As in the United States, Europe has been having its own political gridlock as to its way forward in the face the potential government insolvencies. Most recently, Greece had been the foremost concern. Having been in a severe recession for several years because of budget cuts required per terms of previous financial bailouts by the other countries of the European Union, Greece had called an election to determine whether or not it would stay in the European Union and adhere to the austere budget required by their financial bailout. The alternative was to leave the European Union and default on billions of Euro’s worth of debt. A good portion of this debt was held by major European banks, as well as some major U.S. banks. The fear was that if Greece defaulted, the fallout would be far reaching perhaps undermining the solvency of major global banks and financial institutions. Greece narrowly voted to remain in the Union, but with a significantly divided parliament. No sooner did this occur, than Spain rose to front and center as a problem area. Spain being one of the largest economies in Europe required a new approach to this entire European issue. Germany and France had been forcefully advocating an austere approach to dealing with the over-indebtedness of the countries in the middle of these financial crises. The problem was that the programs of austerity were also damping growth to make it even more difficult for countries like Greece and Spain to deal with their debt problems. Elections in France changed the leadership from Sarkozy to Hollande who was much more sympathetic to relaxing the programs of austerity and do more to stimulate growth. Only Germany’s Angela Merkel remained as the lone, but powerful voice of the austerity programs, and consequently political gridlock. Most recently, Merkel appears to be relaxing her position and the framework of a structural agreement to deal more comprehensively with the issue emerged. Whether the agreement will accomplish this remains to be seen. It did, however briefly, give hope to the investment markets which reacted very favorably to the news.

To compound the uncertainties and the implications surrounding the European financial crisis, lurking in the background, ready to jump forward at any instant, is the financial and economic situation in the United States. More and more frequently, reports are being aired on the mainstream media of an approaching fiscal cliff the United States will be facing at the end of the year. This refers to the prospect of increased taxes and mandatory federal budgets cuts. The outcome is a result of the political gridlock in the United States and is a default position in the event Congress is not able to reach an alternative agreement. Given the extreme ideological polarization of our Congress, the probabilities seem small that an alternative agreement will be reached. There seems to be a fairly wide economic consensus that this is likely to result in the weakening of the already weak US economy. Moreover, even if an agreement is reached, as in Europe, the fixes seem to do little more than “kick the can down the road” a little further without really developing a sustainable solution to very real structural problems. Needless to say, the situation is very complex, and we could continue for some time to discuss it. All of these uncertainties create a very unstable economic and investment environment. The outward appearance is a great deal of volatility as investors swing from the extremes of fear and hope. The relevant question for us is: what is the best investment strategy in this type of environment? There is no shortage of opinion predicting where the investment markets are headed. They range from catastrophic calamity, to the cusp of a new bull market. For over two decades, on a regular daily basis, I consider countless numbers of these viewpoints. I have come to value some commentary and analysis more than others, and I certainly form my own opinions. I have, however, learned several important lessons over the years. One is that no one has a perfect crystal ball. Another is that the reporting media seems to create its own spin. When things are going relatively well, a general impression is created that happy days will never end, creating a type of euphoria. On the other hand, when events turn toward the negative, it sometimes appears that the end of the world is approaching, creating an atmosphere of fear and panic. It is a well documented that investors over-react to news. For example, Dalbar Inc. is a company which studies investor behavior and analyzes investor market returns. The results of their research consistently show that the average investor earns below average returns. For the twenty years ending 12/31/2010 the S&P 500 Index averaged 9.14% a year. The average equity fund investor earned a market return of only 3.83%. While I cannot absolutely dismiss either of the extreme outcomes from occurring, my observation has been that the fundamental principle of risk management, diversification, should still serve as the foundation for a prudently managed investment portfolio. This does not mean that the portfolio will be resistant to all market downturns, and it does not mean that diversification adjustments should never occur. It does suggest, however, maintaining focus and investment discipline is a critical component of navigating what are sometimes, very stormy seas.

Looking forward, it would be great to say that the worst is behind us. Unfortunately, that does not appear to be the case. It is likely that the global economy and investment environment will get worse before it gets better. It will require patience and fortitude whatever the investment allocation is. The silver lining, however, is that unless you believe the world will be ending as a result of these issues, the foundation of future economic health is being established. Despite the grim shorter term picture, my opinion is that the global economic challenges and issues now being confronted will be worked through and resolved, and that the world will not end.

A Review Primer on the Components of Diversification – if needed

The four broad categories, or asset classes, of investments are cash, bonds, or equities. Included within these categories are such things as real estate, commodities such as energy, food, as well as precious metals. Each has its own particular characteristic strengths and weaknesses, and consequently a prudent risk management approach would not allocate 100% to any one of these asset classes.

If we consider cash, for example money market funds, we recognize that this can provide liquidity and stability, but very little investment gain. It is not without risk. In fact, when interest rates are as low as they are today, the risk is known as purchasing power risk. This means that if you have $100,000 in an account today, and $100,000 in the account one year from now, will the $100,000 one year from now be able to purchase what is can purchase today. If inflation is running at 2.5%, one year from now you will have a guaranteed loss of 2.5% in the purchasing power of your account. Currently, by the government’s statistics, this is around the range inflation is running, other independent analysts believe the real inflation number is higher. And some analysts believe that the future rate of inflation will be significantly higher. This suggests to me that while it makes sense to have a portion of an investment portfolio in cash, or cash-like investments such as a money market, 100% would probably be unbalanced in failing to address the unique risks of cash.

This brings us to bonds. Bonds, in general, have traditionally been considered a conservative investment. This is a broad generalization, and it is important to understand some of the unique characteristics of bonds to appreciate their role in an investment portfolio. An attractive characteristic of bonds is that they pay interest on a regular basis, which is of course if the issuer continues to have the ability to pay. The risk that the issuer may not be able to continue paying the interest, as well as the principal at maturity is known as solvency risk. Depending upon the type of bond this risk can be higher or lower. Historically, government of developed economies had been considered low risk, with the United States having the least solvency risk. Municipal bonds have also been considered safe, conservative investments. These days we hear of the developed country bonds being less safe because of over-indebtedness, as well as municipalities in the United States declaring bankruptcy. Another risk of bonds is known as interest rate risk. This is the risk that if interest rates increase, bonds already owned will decline in value. Some investors say this is not a problem because if they do not sell the bonds until they mature, they expect to receive all of their principal back, as well as the promised interest payments. What these investors neglect to consider is that if interest rates increase, it is usually for a good reason, such as higher inflation. They are stuck with lower interest paying bonds they had previously purchased. The bottom line is that bond can also decline in value, sometimes significantly. In historically low interest rate environments, as we currently have, this risk is elevated. These risk management implications imply that while bonds are an important part of an investment portfolio, they also should not represent 100%, and the portion of an investment portfolio that is in bonds should itself be diversified with respect to the types of bonds and the unique risks for each type.

This brings us to equities, or stocks. As with bonds there are a wide range of offerings, as well as a wide range of approaches to investing in them. They have their own unique set of risks, as well as presenting opportunities. Despite regular variations in value, sometime significantly so, they offer income opportunities through dividend payment, and/or growth opportunities through their increase in value. Needless to say they can also decline in value. With a diversified investment position, for example in fund of utility companies, the main risk seems to be primarily psychological. The belief that, for example, that all of the strongest and largest utility companies in a fund will simple become worthless is placing a disproportionate weight on the occurrence of something with an extremely small probability of happening. Despite periodic declines in value, sometimes having nothing to do the real merit of the investment itself, these funds can pay annual dividends of 4% per year or more. In an environment where interest rates are so low, having some component of a portfolio in equities, or stocks, is part of a well diversified portfolio. One way in which the potential volatility can be managed is by having a smaller percentage.

It is interesting to note that some of the same investors in bonds who claim that it does not matter if the bond declines in value because they intend to hold the bond until maturity, will consider it unacceptable to own a utility fund paying 4% or more because of the potential for it to decline in value.

Nonetheless, each type of investment has its own unique set of risks as well as opportunities. There is no one safe harbor. The best overall way to construct and manage a portfolio is with a diversified selection of different types of investments. In some cases, there will be significant declines in value. Some investors believe it to be possible to time when the declines and when the increases are coming, thereby avoiding declines while riding the increases up. Even if this were consistently possible, and there is reason to doubt this, from a prudent investment decision-making perspective, there needs to be some rational decision-making basis, other than an environment of fear and panic driving the markets. With the outcome of so many hugely impactful global issues pending resolution, trying to respond to these unresolved issues offers little other than randomness as a foundation. This is unacceptable, and argues all the more strongly, for holding a well structured portfolio comprised of cash, bonds and equities despite the volatility, and periodic declines.

Wednesday, October 05, 2011

Recapitalize the Banks?


The concern about a Greek default is really more about the contagion effect. The central question is how does one contain the impact arising from a disorderly Greek default. From this follows the discussion about potential bank recapitalization. There are all sorts of sub-plots in the recapitalization schemes, from the moral hazard issue, to the inequity inflicted on those who have been fiscally responsible, to whether or not an effective scheme can really be created to many more. Politicians have been receiving the brunt of criticism because of the perceived lack of leadership in dealing with an extremely complex, and perhaps insoluble by mere mortals problem. I would be one of the last ones to come to the defense of the politicians, however, the political posture of the “deer in the headlights” when facing public outcry to “do something, do anything”, is understandable giving the mutually check-mated position the global financial situation has emerged into.

The idea of recapitalization is lacking unless one can quantify with some reasonable degree of confidence the extent of recapitalization that would be needed to effectively resolve the issues. I have heard plausible figures of up to $2 trillion dollars worth. I have not, however, seen much discussion of potential derivative exposure, and counter party risks which might amplify the amount of fiscal deficiencies,  and the number of systemically important institutions which may be impacted. If there is one thing that the institutional failures of 2008 should have taught us, it is that with the degree and scale of economic and financial integration that currently exists, it is all but impossible to see where the chips may fall, or the ensuing consequences. Moreover, when talking recapitalization, ultimately one is talking about using public money to enable those who, either directly or indirectly, were responsible for egregiously imprudent financial behaviors to retain their private ownership interest with minimal risk of loss. The backlash from this sort of thinking is emerging at the main street level that potentially will threaten governments if it continues. As evidence witness the emerging demonstrations in Greece and on Wall Street, and the rising pervasive discontent among so many of the affected citizenry. Perhaps a more honest and equitable approach to allowing Greece to default, and stabilizing the banking system would be an outright state takeover of those systemically important institutions to give the funding public an equity stake rather than a debt holders stake in future recovery. When looking at the impact of the US TARP program the argument is made that the US actually made money from many of its bailouts. I think, however, that this misses the point, if governments are going to use public money to bailout out private institutions, it should be done with the focus of maximizing the return of the investing public, as well as a policy measure to provide a consequence to those who have acting so financially imprudent, directly, or through agency. It really is time to start acting like responsible adults.

Friday, September 30, 2011

George Soros' European Crisis Solution

If one accepts George Soro’s solution to preventing a second Great Depression, the prognosis is indeed grim. His solution, while in itself conceptually problematic, appears in a pragmatic context to reside in never-never land. The bold steps he presents as necessary conditions to prevent a second Great Depression require the cooperation and coordination which would transcend the polarization and fractionalization of regional narrow self-interest at such a scale that defies observable reality. Moreover, while the conditions he proposes may or may not be necessary, he has not presented a convincing argument that they are sufficient conditions.

A nebulous foundation block of his strategy is to provide time for “Europe to develop a growth strategy, without which the debt problem cannot be solved”. The development of a growth strategy is central to every economic and business interest, as he well knows. The question which must be asked is what the potential drivers would be of any effective growth strategy, what are the competitive and comparative advantages that Europe could bring forth, and what the time frame for implementation would be? If this proposed growth strategy would be a palliative to the “debt problem”, one is assuming a sufficient rate of growth to offset the burden of debt service. Even assuming a growth strategy could be developed; getting a realistic idea of whether the growth rate would be sufficient to counter the demands of debt servicing takes us into the unquantifiable speculative realm. While George Soros is a demonstrably recognized master in the realm of speculation, a no small part has been his ability to be adaptable and flexible as changing conditions warrant. Unfortunately governmental and national policies rarely show the same nimbleness in response to changing realities.

Wednesday, September 28, 2011

European Union Debt Crisis

The majority of the global economic discourse these days revolves around a central thesis; too much debt, and burdensome deficits. To some degree, the debt problem contributes to the deficit problem because of the requirements of servicing the debt. The actions of policy makers are decried as lacking in leadership as they stumble around seeking politically acceptable ways to resolve these issues, while at the same time being economically effective in really addressing the issues. The results have been skewed towards being politically acceptable via some form of “kicking the can down the road”. The economic realities suggest the end of the proverbial “road” may be near. The debt issue is more of a global issue than regional issue; or at least global with respect to the indebtedness of the western developed economies. Questions such as whether Greece remains part of the European Union seem a little flat when one considers that regardless of whether Greece is or is not part of the EU, the outcome of resolving this issue in any manner other than some sort of default is unlikely. Because of the integrated scale of connectedness, I doubt anyone, or any institution really fully knows what the unanticipated consequences and effects will be. Consequently, talk of “ring fencing” or containment of these issues smacks more of intellectual arrogance than a sober acceptance of the magnitude of the problem. I suspect that after all the “shucking and jiving” is done what we a headed for, and what seems inevitable, is a global restructuring of monetary regimes with some attempt at a functional global monetary unit, be it a basket of currencies, or for that matter a basket of commodities. Along the same line, it would seem that the only effectively managed way out of this global financial mess will be some sort concerted global effort to inflate away the real value of the debt burden.

Wednesday, September 21, 2011

Critique of Roger Altman's Financial Times Commentary

Roger Altman, founder and chairman of Evercore Partners and former US deputy Treasury secretary under President Bill Clinton offered commentary in the Financial Times suggesting America and Europe are on the verge of a disastrous recession. While he may be correct, I see several problems in his analysis.


Roger Altman’s analysis and proposed resolution to the unfolding European financial debacle leaves much to be desired. Interspersed with a review the ongoing events are a great many hypothetical conjectures followed by conclusions presented as some sort of deterministic inevitability. Moreover, his proposed resolution, when compared to an existing model of what he proposes, does not appear to conclusively lead to a better result.

For example, he asks “How do we know that another recession is approaching?”. A more accurate statement would be “it is probable that another recession is approaching”. The simple fact is that none of us has a perfect crystal ball, and from what I can see there is no deterministic cause and effect mechanism that provides a conclusive outcome. Altman may be right, and then again, he may not be. To assert anything more than a probabilistic conjecture is at best an error of judgment and at worse hyperbole directed at serving some sort of agenda.

Altman follows by asserting that “there is no other credible explanation for the relentless fall in interest rates”. I suspect that there are readers who could provide other explanations. Whether they were credible may be more in the mind of the beholder. This is but one more example of the “in-the-box thinking” that keeps potentially great minds bouncing of the walls of the conceptual framework of worn out economic models. A failure to explore other potential outcomes and ways to reach them is more an indication of intellectual impoverishment than a deterministic economic conclusion.

Altman’s proposed resolution is “A single currency representing 17 separate nations inevitably requires a unified balance sheet behind it and, following that, a form of fiscal union. The time for denying the latter is over.” However, we already have an operating model of many separate governments with a unified balance sheet and some sort of fiscal union; that would be the United States. Clearly the observable evidence shouts out that this remedy is more than a little problematic as well.

Tuesday, September 06, 2011

Pending Global Financial Crisis

The situation in Europe is very serious. From my research and analysis, my conclusion is that a Greek default is already “baked in”. If this situation were limited to a Greek insolvency, it would probably be manageable by the EU. Unfortunately, there are a number of other European countries that
represent a much larger potential problem because of the size of their economies and banking system, Spain and Italy being among them. I have even heard reports that there are some German and French banks that may have some capital adequacy issues. Fundamentally, the real problem is the potential contagion effect that arises. A number of factors are at work here. One is that bond investors start to demand higher interest rates because of the greater risks they perceive in the markets. This only makes the problem worse because it increases the cost of borrowing specifically for countries like Greece. This in turn, makes their financial situation even more challenging. More generally, it would be reasonable to expect borrowing costs to increase because of greater
demand for scarce capital. So far governing bodies in the European Union such as the European Financial Stability Fund, the International Monetary Fund, etc, have been trying to make capital available, or restructure existing debt. While these efforts have taken a potentially explosive situation and put it on a slower burn, they have not been effective in resolving the issues. As in the
United States, even if a theoretically economic effective solution were possible, political differences interfere with the implementation. In my opinion, there will be sovereign defaults. However, even if we are “only” talking about write downs of loan balances, the question arises of the impact on the banking system’s in the individual countries, and globally. Here we have another aspect of the potential contagion effects because banks and insurance companies throughout the world, including the United States, hold these impaired assets as part of their own investments. Moreover, a major risk factor which is very opaque, is what “derivative” exposure these various institutions hold. Derivatives are complex artificially constructed investments that may magnify greatly the risk on the books of these major financial institutions.


So far, one response of investors has been more what I would call a conditioned reactive response, rather than a response that reflects economic fundamentals. That response has been to migrate toward what are perceived to be “safer” assets. These have included US government bonds and
precious metals. This has helped hold down interest rates of US debt. In my opinion, while some position may be warranted in US Government bonds, the US financial system is on the precipice of a disaster waiting to happen. It should be kept in mind that one of the largest; if not the largest holder of US debt is China. They are increasingly expressing misgivings about the US financial situation. We are also seeing an increasing migration of capital into assets like gold. This would be capital that presumably would have been available for additional debt purchases. Both from the governmental side as well as the banking and financial institution sides have capital adequacy issues.


At this point I do not see much that gives me encouragement of a constructive resolution to these issues. In my opinion, at least for the near to medium term future, we are looking at increasing financial and social turbulence. The historical evidence suggests that the way in which policy makers will focus their efforts will be to try to inflate their way out of extreme over indebtedness by creating more and more money. Ultimately this will probably not work, and if I were to have to speculate, I don’t think it out of the question that within three years there will at least be serious discussions among global policy makers about the creation of new currency regimes.

Since we are in uncharted territory on a global scale, this is a time a great uncertainty in which events could move more or less rapidly depending on what the precipitating factors are. For example, the effects of a major natural disaster, a terrorist act, or who knows what else, are impossible to determine in an already fragile global financial system.

In my opinion, and reflective of the strategy we are currently being guided by, the best defense will be diversification which is targeted toward addressing the realities of the geopolitical and economic environment for the foreseeable future. This doesn’t mean there won’t be some volatility, but the objective is to be better able to weather the storm, retain value, and take advantage of the opportunities that will arise in what appears to be an oncoming global financial crisis.

Saturday, January 30, 2010

Financial Meltdown; Part Two?

How fast things can change; in either direction. I studiously try to avoid thinking in short term time frames. It usually leads to sub-optimal, emotionally driven decision making, rather than longer term strategicially driven decision making. Sometimes, however, near horizon events are compelling enough to warrant shorter term tactical changes of direction.

I do not see the global financial system being on the verge of a financial apocalypse, at the present time. Last year, at this time, presented a distinct possibilty that we were. Nonetheless, there are a number of very troubling signs on the near term horizon. One of these is an increasing probabilty of a sovereign debt crisis acting as a catalyst for global financial meltdown part two.

A number of countries and regions, such as China, Brazil and India, appear to be economically strong and gaining traction. In and of itself, this might lead one to believe in the underlying attractiveness of some portion of capital allocation to these regions. I concur in the the underlying premise of longer term opprtunity in theses regions. However, there are a number of factors which temper my longer term view of these opportunites, and their derivative considerations, to warrant shorter term tactical changes.

Among these considerations is the growing potential of sovereign debt crises acting as a catalyst for "Global Financial Meltdown, Part Two". The United States and the European region, in general, are seriously problematic. Several countries, in particular, are at the leading edge of a potential governmental solvency crisis. These are Greece, Spain, Italy, and England. S & P recently lowered the debt worthiness rating of the second largest economy in the world, Japan. Because of the growing deficit problem in our own country, and a Congress that may not be able too deal with it, even if the U.S. Congress were to be functional, it appears that the United States may not be too far behind with respect to a solvency crisis within the next five to ten years. This is but one of a number of signifcant factors which should prompt some additional strategic thinking away froma "full steam ahead", business as usual mentality.

As should be quite evident from our recent experiences of the 2007-2008 global financial meltdown, as people ruah for the exit, even assets which have strong underlying fundamental strength get painted with the same brush of value deterioration as panic sets in. Indeed, from a longer term perspective, these can be rare opportunities for the investor, assuming the emotional, pyschological, time, and financial abilities to withstand the ensuing trauma and economic dislocation.

In my opinion, a more prudent approach would be to err on the side of caution. After the financial market runups from March 2008, it appears to me unreasonable to expect, and improbable to achieve an immediate followup to this. The chances are that if we have really turned the corner with regard to a sustainable economic turnaround, there will be many years of compelling opportunties ahead. On the other hand, if reconsideration of the financial landscape leads one to believe in at least a reasonable prospect of financial meltdown, part two, it would be prudent to consider a more defensive portfolio allocation.

These are soome of hazards of the economic and investment landscape at the present time. It does nott consider unaccounted for contingencies, which seem to always arise in some form or other. It presents a set of risks, as well as a set of opportunities. In my opinion, the best way in which to deal with this environment is to maintain a vigilent and critical view of ongoing events. It is necessary to be responsive, while not over-reactive, as to how they may impact our longer term strategic outlook. It is important to keep in mind is that no one has a perfect crystal ball, and that because of institutionalized imprudence, there really is no safe harbor left. The most effective management will how well potential risks and rewards can be balanced in the midst of growing global economic dislocations and the financial restructuring resulting thereof.