Managing Structural Economic Change and the Financial Markets

The second quarter of 2013 was particularly challenging for investors. The last two months, in particular, were impacted by the market turbulence which emerged from concerns that the Federal Reserve Bank would change its current low interest rate policy. The current policy of maintaining low interest rates was intended to support economic growth in the United States by making credit more affordable. They have done this through what is known as their quantitative easing program, which is essentially buying bonds with money that does not exist until they create it. While the historical data does not necessarily support the belief, many investors, nonetheless, associate increasing interest rates with poorer stock market performance. The prospect of a change in interest rate policy created additional uncertainty and a shift in investor sentiment from the irrational exuberance equity investors had during the first two months of the year to more anxious concerns as to the sustainability the equity markets.

What may well be a more fundamental issue, however, is that bond investors also seized upon the prospective change in the Federal Reserve Banks policy and started exiting from bonds. Trim Tabs, an investment research firm, says that investors liquidated over $60 billion from bond mutual funds and exchange traded funds in June. If this is true, that would be the single-largest monthly redemption in history. Some commentators are calling this the end of a 30 year bull market in bonds.

This drove interest rates higher causing losses for traditionally bond investments. Bonds have traditionally, and historically, been considered conservative investments. With bonds as well as stock losing value, this left very few “safe harbors” for refuge from this storm. Cash is one option that some investors will flee to, and an allocation to some percentage allocation to cash is certainly warranted as a prudent allocation strategy. However, with dollars being created without backing by anything other than the “full faith and credit” of a government that does not appear to be capable of operating in a solvent manner, it is doubtful that this is the safe refuge it might appear to be. Moreover, cash offers very little in investment return. While cash is a valuable component of an investment strategy, just as with any other asset, having too much of it has its own hazards.

In my view, while there are many economically sound justifications for higher interest rates to exist, the markets have severely over-reacted to the prospect of a policy change in the Federal Reserve Bank. Having listened to Ben Bernanke’s entire speech, I heard him say that depending upon economic conditions the Federal Reserve Bank would adjust its policy. If the economy was doing well the Federal Reserve would gradually reduce the $85 billion per month of bonds it is buying to keep interest rates low. If the economy is not doing so well, it would continue its policy, and if conditions warranted, it would even increase the amount. From what I can see, given economic conditions, the Federal Reserve Bank seems more likely than not to continue its policy longer than expected. While there can be other factors than the Federal Reserve Bank affecting interest rates, it appears to me that investors have over-reacted toward the downside during the last few months, just as they over-reacted to the upside in equity markets during the first two months of the year. These last few months of stock and bond market behavior appear to be more panicked emotional reactions of market traders rather than the economically sound reasoning of longer-term investors.

In my analysis, I would be surprised to see the Federal Reserve Bank make any significant change in the near future. The consequences for doing so would be too severe in its impact on our anemically growing economy. Were they to change their policy and allow interest rates to rise, the most recent market response to these prospects suggests that at least the initial market response would be decline in both the stock and bond markets. The result would be a further damper on economic growth because of what economist call the “wealth effect” When account values go up, people are more willing to spend and consume. When account values go down the reverse is true which results in slower economic growth. Additionally, the housing market plays a very big role in the strength of our economy. With the housing market appearing to be in the recovery stage, higher mortgage rates, resulting from a change in Federal Reserve Bank policy, could quickly kill the housing recovery, again stalling economic growth. The other important factor is that when interest rates rise, the debt servicing liabilities of the U.S. government and municipalities also start to increase. At present, the servicing of the existing debt is not financially sustainable, even given historically low interest rates. Consequently, taken together, it does not seem likely that we will see a change in Federal Reserve Bank policy anytime soon. An unknown, however, is how much control the Federal Reserve Bank really has left in capping interest rates. There have been reports of Central Banks throughout the world selling their holding of U.S. Treasury bonds. This would put additional pressure on interest rates to rise.

Overall the global economic system is drowning in debt. Were it not for the heavy debt loads that are being carried, the underlying latent economic vigor would look promising. The real challenge to policy makers is how to manage an unwinding and restructuring of that debt. This must be done in the context of continuing demands for financial resources. The real danger is having the management of this process get out of control and become a collapse rather that a slower burn process. If there is a systemic economic collapse the trajectory of where events will lead is unknown. At this point, while I do see economic turbulence ahead, I do not place a high probability on a general overall economic meltdown, at least in the near future.

Creditors of the World Are Not Necessarily Captive to the Debtors

In response to Martin Wolf's article in the Financial Times,  I offer the following commentary.

The conceptual framing of this argument is somewhat misleading. To begin with the phrase indicating a belief by creditors that they will inherit the earth suggests a context for concentrating wealth and power that is more benign than the underlying capitalist and human drive for dominance and control. There are enough examples in human history, and biology, be it modern or ancient, that one does not have to be much an historian to be compelled to believe that a basic survival instinct is to attempt to manage one’s environment so as to better the chances of surviving and thriving. Because of the complex web of relationships there is often some sort of mutual interdependence, sometimes beneficial, sometimes not so much.

The heart of Martin Wolf’s argument seems to suggest that the relationship between creditors and debtors is such that there is some sort of “lock” binding specific sets of creditors and debtors to one another. While perhaps the world cannot trade with Mars, specific parts of the world can rearrange their trading relationships and thier drivers of growth. For example, while no doubt the western developed world does serve an important function in sucking up the exports of China, it is also possible that through a combination of weaning itself from such heavy dependence on an export driven economy by developing its domestic aggregate demand, and shifting its trade relationships to for example Brazil, or even Russia, to meet some of its export needs it can transition from its heavy dependence its current export targets. As to being held captive because of its $3,200bn of currency reserves, it should be keep in mind that it is only held captive as long as the currency reserve exists in its current form. If these reserves begin to be exchanged for foreign equity positions representing control in strategic future resources that China needs, the current foreign reserves cease to be a control on China’s behavior, and rather serve to further concentrate power and wealth in the hands of those with capital.

Is this so different than when the Native Americans in New York sold Manhattan Island for the equivalent of $24 in baubles, or when the Soviet Union dissolved, dispersed shares of ownership of formerly state owned enterprises among the people, only to have aspiring oligarchs acquire and concentrate these assets for controlling interests in exchange for perhaps teh equivalent of a supply of vodka for a short period of time. There are innumerous other examples which can be given wherein the exchange of future earnings capacity (read indebtedness) for a more immediate gratification leads to servitude.

To suggest that because we are all on the same planet, as Martin Wolf does in his argument, the fix to the current capital imbalances are compelled by some notion of constraint by reciprocity is to have blinders hindering one’s vision as to the fuller range of feasible alternatives.

Recapitalize the Banks?

The concern about a Greek default is really more about the contagion effect. The central question is how does one contain the impact arising from a disorderly Greek default. From this follows the discussion about potential bank recapitalization. There are all sorts of sub-plots in the recapitalization schemes, from the moral hazard issue, to the inequity inflicted on those who have been fiscally responsible, to whether or not an effective scheme can really be created to many more. Politicians have been receiving the brunt of criticism because of the perceived lack of leadership in dealing with an extremely complex, and perhaps insoluble by mere mortals problem. I would be one of the last ones to come to the defense of the politicians, however, the political posture of the “deer in the headlights” when facing public outcry to “do something, do anything”, is understandable giving the mutually check-mated position the global financial situation has emerged into.

The idea of recapitalization is lacking unless one can quantify with some reasonable degree of confidence the extent of recapitalization that would be needed to effectively resolve the issues. I have heard plausible figures of up to $2 trillion dollars worth. I have not, however, seen much discussion of potential derivative exposure, and counter party risks which might amplify the amount of fiscal deficiencies,  and the number of systemically important institutions which may be impacted. If there is one thing that the institutional failures of 2008 should have taught us, it is that with the degree and scale of economic and financial integration that currently exists, it is all but impossible to see where the chips may fall, or the ensuing consequences. Moreover, when talking recapitalization, ultimately one is talking about using public money to enable those who, either directly or indirectly, were responsible for egregiously imprudent financial behaviors to retain their private ownership interest with minimal risk of loss. The backlash from this sort of thinking is emerging at the main street level that potentially will threaten governments if it continues. As evidence witness the emerging demonstrations in Greece and on Wall Street, and the rising pervasive discontent among so many of the affected citizenry. Perhaps a more honest and equitable approach to allowing Greece to default, and stabilizing the banking system would be an outright state takeover of those systemically important institutions to give the funding public an equity stake rather than a debt holders stake in future recovery. When looking at the impact of the US TARP program the argument is made that the US actually made money from many of its bailouts. I think, however, that this misses the point, if governments are going to use public money to bailout out private institutions, it should be done with the focus of maximizing the return of the investing public, as well as a policy measure to provide a consequence to those who have acting so financially imprudent, directly, or through agency. It really is time to start acting like responsible adults.

European Union Debt Crisis

The majority of the global economic discourse these days revolves around a central thesis; too much debt, and burdensome deficits. To some degree, the debt problem contributes to the deficit problem because of the requirements of servicing the debt. The actions of policy makers are decried as lacking in leadership as they stumble around seeking politically acceptable ways to resolve these issues, while at the same time being economically effective in really addressing the issues. The results have been skewed towards being politically acceptable via some form of “kicking the can down the road”. The economic realities suggest the end of the proverbial “road” may be near. The debt issue is more of a global issue than regional issue; or at least global with respect to the indebtedness of the western developed economies. Questions such as whether Greece remains part of the European Union seem a little flat when one considers that regardless of whether Greece is or is not part of the EU, the outcome of resolving this issue in any manner other than some sort of default is unlikely. Because of the integrated scale of connectedness, I doubt anyone, or any institution really fully knows what the unanticipated consequences and effects will be. Consequently, talk of “ring fencing” or containment of these issues smacks more of intellectual arrogance than a sober acceptance of the magnitude of the problem. I suspect that after all the “shucking and jiving” is done what we a headed for, and what seems inevitable, is a global restructuring of monetary regimes with some attempt at a functional global monetary unit, be it a basket of currencies, or for that matter a basket of commodities. Along the same line, it would seem that the only effectively managed way out of this global financial mess will be some sort concerted global effort to inflate away the real value of the debt burden.

Critique of Roger Altman's Financial Times Commentary

Roger Altman, founder and chairman of Evercore Partners and former US deputy Treasury secretary under President Bill Clinton offered commentary in the Financial Times suggesting America and Europe are on the verge of a disastrous recession. While he may be correct, I see several problems in his analysis.

 http://blogs.ft.com/the-a-list/2011/09/21/america-and-europe-are-on-the-verge-of-disastrous-recession/#axzz1YNL9mxwW

Roger Altman’s analysis and proposed resolution to the unfolding European financial debacle leaves much to be desired. Interspersed with a review the ongoing events are a great many hypothetical conjectures followed by conclusions presented as some sort of deterministic inevitability. Moreover, his proposed resolution, when compared to an existing model of what he proposes, does not appear to conclusively lead to a better result.

For example, he asks “How do we know that another recession is approaching?”. A more accurate statement would be “it is probable that another recession is approaching”. The simple fact is that none of us has a perfect crystal ball, and from what I can see there is no deterministic cause and effect mechanism that provides a conclusive outcome. Altman may be right, and then again, he may not be. To assert anything more than a probabilistic conjecture is at best an error of judgment and at worse hyperbole directed at serving some sort of agenda.

Altman follows by asserting that “there is no other credible explanation for the relentless fall in interest rates”. I suspect that there are readers who could provide other explanations. Whether they were credible may be more in the mind of the beholder. This is but one more example of the “in-the-box thinking” that keeps potentially great minds bouncing of the walls of the conceptual framework of worn out economic models. A failure to explore other potential outcomes and ways to reach them is more an indication of intellectual impoverishment than a deterministic economic conclusion.

Altman’s proposed resolution is “A single currency representing 17 separate nations inevitably requires a unified balance sheet behind it and, following that, a form of fiscal union. The time for denying the latter is over.” However, we already have an operating model of many separate governments with a unified balance sheet and some sort of fiscal union; that would be the United States. Clearly the observable evidence shouts out that this remedy is more than a little problematic as well.

Economic Policy Direction Shortcomings

The public policy edge of managing this global financial crisis has been focused on opening up the credit markets and re-establishing solvency in select financial institutions. As emergency interventions, they represent a monumental attempt to resuscitate a seriously damaged global economic system. The actual results, so far, have been only marginally convincing, if at all convincing, as to their successful outcome.

It is more than a little ironic that a primary reason this state of affairs arose is because of imprudent lending decisions. Financial institutions damaged their balance sheets, to the point of impairing their continuing business viability. Credit markets contracted and liquidity dried up. Credit is the lifeblood of our global economic system. Unfortunately, or fortunately as the case may be, prudent extensions of credit are based upon the credit worthiness of the borrower.

It should be fairly clear, by the increasing foreclosures and bankruptcies, that prospective borrowers do not, in general, represent good credit risks at the present time. It is also widely agreed that we are looking at a potentially severe and drawn out recession (depression?). We can reasonably expect that prospective borrowers will find themselves in even more distressed economic circumstances in the near future. As such, one must ask why a lending institution, after already getting its fingers burned through imprudent lending practices, would want to extend credit to prospective borrowers with deteriorating solvency prospects.

Additionally, the question should also arise as to why, a borrower already overextended, and facing a deteriorating economic picture, would wish to borrow more, other than as an act of desperation, or other irrationality. Perhaps it is a case of “if there is nothing left to lose, why not go for broke at the expense of an imprudent lender.”

It is not surprising then that despite massive capital injections, the credit markets are still sluggish. After shoring up their balance sheets, at public expense, lending institutions are possibly returning to their roots of being some of the more rational players (this is not a high bar to cross these days) in their economic and business decisions. The wiser deployment of capital would be to acquire distressed assets rather than extend credit to borrowers with poor prospects.

The dilemma facing policy-makers is still how to prevent, or at least mitigate, a global economic slowdown. What are the drivers of economic growth to be if growing debt financed consumption cannot be counted on? Several possibilities arise. As an example, China, and the Asia region, has the potential of stimulating their own internal domestic consumption. Inflation fears may have restrained efforts in this regard before. Now, however, prospects of an economic slowdown, and a more benign (at least for the time being) inflation outlook may open this up as an expeditious policy direction.

From the perspective of the West, and the United States in particular, there is a great deal that needs to be done to re-establish a strong and competitive economy. There are immense infrastructure needs and well as immense needs to fortify the intellectual capital base of the country through adequate funding of education and research. An assessment needs to occur in order to determine what the competitive and comparative advantage and long-term needs of the United States really are. This needs to be done in the context of the United States as a global citizen and its constructive relationship to other global economic players. Once this is determined focused attention and political will must be directed in this direction.