The extraordinary measures being taken by central and governments in an effort to stabilize create markets, and intervene in cases of prospective institutional insolvencies, will result in a huge funding need by these governments. In the United States, the Congressional Budget Office has estimated that the Budget for the United States will exceed $750 billion next year. Other estimates are for a U.S. budget deficit in excess of $1 trillion. This is before possible and probable additional costs for an economic stimulus package, $300-$400 billion, and other funding demands arising from this financial meltdown. Questions which should be of interest are: Where will this funding come from; and what be be the implications of funding these needs?
The United States has had the benefit of foreign sources of capital to meet its need of $60-$70 billion per month. This was prior to this financial meltdown and the new capital funding requirements ensuing. Countries like China, and petro-dollar beneficiaries were accomodating enough, for whatever reason, to meet these needs. If the U.S. budget deficit doubles, while probably not a strictly linear relationship, one might estimate that the capital funding requirements of the United States from foriegn capital sources might rise to $110-$120 billion per month. What would be the willingness, ability, and desirability of foreign capital sources to meet this need?
In the context of a global economic slowdown it would appear that foreign reserves of US $'s would diminish from decreases in exports as well as lower oil prices. This would leave less funds available for re-investment back into U.S. Government debt instruments. One might also expect that as the U.S. financial picture becomes more impaired by its crushing debt burden, potential investors may well look more closely at alternative choices, as well as the redeployment of capital back into their own countries. In any case, this suggests that in order to secure the funding necessary for ongoing operations, the costs, ie interest rates, will be pushed up my market conditions. As the United States and other central banks have become the "bailouters of last resort", who has the ability and willingness to bailout these governments and institutions? I suspect there is no one to do this. If so, this may well make the current financial meltdown look like a picnic on a nice spring day.
If the current operational strategies offered by Central Banks and governments are any indication, we might expect that a high interest rate environment(read impaired credit availability), in a severe recessionary environment would be unacceptable. It would then seem like the strategy of the printing press for the manufacturing of money would be the only feasible choice available. One might then conclude that despite this current period of asset deflation and a strengtening of the dollar, this may well be a period that is relatively short lived.
While there is no free lunch, there may well be soup lines.
Sunday, November 02, 2008
Thursday, October 30, 2008
Economic Policy Direction Shortcomings
The public policy edge of managing this global financial crisis has been focused on opening up the credit markets and re-establishing solvency in select financial institutions. As emergency interventions, they represent a monumental attempt to resuscitate a seriously damaged global economic system. The actual results, so far, have been only marginally convincing, if at all convincing, as to their successful outcome.
It is more than a little ironic that a primary reason this state of affairs arose is because of imprudent lending decisions. Financial institutions damaged their balance sheets, to the point of impairing their continuing business viability. Credit markets contracted and liquidity dried up. Credit is the lifeblood of our global economic system. Unfortunately, or fortunately as the case may be, prudent extensions of credit are based upon the credit worthiness of the borrower.
It should be fairly clear, by the increasing foreclosures and bankruptcies, that prospective borrowers do not, in general, represent good credit risks at the present time. It is also widely agreed that we are looking at a potentially severe and drawn out recession (depression?). We can reasonably expect that prospective borrowers will find themselves in even more distressed economic circumstances in the near future. As such, one must ask why a lending institution, after already getting its fingers burned through imprudent lending practices, would want to extend credit to prospective borrowers with deteriorating solvency prospects.
Additionally, the question should also arise as to why, a borrower already overextended, and facing a deteriorating economic picture, would wish to borrow more, other than as an act of desperation, or other irrationality. Perhaps it is a case of “if there is nothing left to lose, why not go for broke at the expense of an imprudent lender.”
It is not surprising then that despite massive capital injections, the credit markets are still sluggish. After shoring up their balance sheets, at public expense, lending institutions are possibly returning to their roots of being some of the more rational players (this is not a high bar to cross these days) in their economic and business decisions. The wiser deployment of capital would be to acquire distressed assets rather than extend credit to borrowers with poor prospects.
The dilemma facing policy-makers is still how to prevent, or at least mitigate, a global economic slowdown. What are the drivers of economic growth to be if growing debt financed consumption cannot be counted on? Several possibilities arise. As an example, China, and the Asia region, has the potential of stimulating their own internal domestic consumption. Inflation fears may have restrained efforts in this regard before. Now, however, prospects of an economic slowdown, and a more benign (at least for the time being) inflation outlook may open this up as an expeditious policy direction.
From the perspective of the West, and the United States in particular, there is a great deal that needs to be done to re-establish a strong and competitive economy. There are immense infrastructure needs and well as immense needs to fortify the intellectual capital base of the country through adequate funding of education and research. An assessment needs to occur in order to determine what the competitive and comparative advantage and long-term needs of the United States really are. This needs to be done in the context of the United States as a global citizen and its constructive relationship to other global economic players. Once this is determined focused attention and political will must be directed in this direction.
It is more than a little ironic that a primary reason this state of affairs arose is because of imprudent lending decisions. Financial institutions damaged their balance sheets, to the point of impairing their continuing business viability. Credit markets contracted and liquidity dried up. Credit is the lifeblood of our global economic system. Unfortunately, or fortunately as the case may be, prudent extensions of credit are based upon the credit worthiness of the borrower.
It should be fairly clear, by the increasing foreclosures and bankruptcies, that prospective borrowers do not, in general, represent good credit risks at the present time. It is also widely agreed that we are looking at a potentially severe and drawn out recession (depression?). We can reasonably expect that prospective borrowers will find themselves in even more distressed economic circumstances in the near future. As such, one must ask why a lending institution, after already getting its fingers burned through imprudent lending practices, would want to extend credit to prospective borrowers with deteriorating solvency prospects.
Additionally, the question should also arise as to why, a borrower already overextended, and facing a deteriorating economic picture, would wish to borrow more, other than as an act of desperation, or other irrationality. Perhaps it is a case of “if there is nothing left to lose, why not go for broke at the expense of an imprudent lender.”
It is not surprising then that despite massive capital injections, the credit markets are still sluggish. After shoring up their balance sheets, at public expense, lending institutions are possibly returning to their roots of being some of the more rational players (this is not a high bar to cross these days) in their economic and business decisions. The wiser deployment of capital would be to acquire distressed assets rather than extend credit to borrowers with poor prospects.
The dilemma facing policy-makers is still how to prevent, or at least mitigate, a global economic slowdown. What are the drivers of economic growth to be if growing debt financed consumption cannot be counted on? Several possibilities arise. As an example, China, and the Asia region, has the potential of stimulating their own internal domestic consumption. Inflation fears may have restrained efforts in this regard before. Now, however, prospects of an economic slowdown, and a more benign (at least for the time being) inflation outlook may open this up as an expeditious policy direction.
From the perspective of the West, and the United States in particular, there is a great deal that needs to be done to re-establish a strong and competitive economy. There are immense infrastructure needs and well as immense needs to fortify the intellectual capital base of the country through adequate funding of education and research. An assessment needs to occur in order to determine what the competitive and comparative advantage and long-term needs of the United States really are. This needs to be done in the context of the United States as a global citizen and its constructive relationship to other global economic players. Once this is determined focused attention and political will must be directed in this direction.
Sunday, October 05, 2008
Financial Crisis Solutions
Congress has passed the Paulson Mega Bailout Plan. Much of the public dialogue around this issue appears to confuse the two major factors underlying this crisis. These two factors are liquidity and solvency.
The credit markets are the lifeblood of a healthy functioning global economy. This financial crisis has resulted in a “freezing up” of the credit markets. Despite Central Banks flooding these markets with access to funds, the credit markets had remained frozen. The ostensible reason is that there is an underlying fear of institutional insolvency arising from exposure to toxic assets on their balance sheets. Because of the complexity of the financial structure of these assets, valuation becomes, more or less, conjecture. At the very least there is an asymmetric knowledge regarding the real quality of these assets. Probably, however, this even overstates the value assessment of these assets because, apparently, even the holders of these assets have exercised poor judgment regarding their value.
A more nefarious explanation as the why the credit markets continue to remain frozen after hundreds of billions of dollars have been injected into the system, could be a “money cartel strategy”. In this case, the fear generated by this credit crisis provides great cover for the institutional withholding of credit. The resulting worsening of financial market conditions result in more institutional and corporate failures and an increased availability of distressed asset sales for those who have access to capital.
Whichever explanation may be partially, or wholly, representative, the recently passed Paulson Plan is intended, at least at face value, to address the frozen credit market conditions by alleviating the institutional solvency concerns.
Unfortunately, as the point has been made by Roubini, and others, this only partially addresses the real problem which is the crushing personal debt burden. This is an underlying weak point which has lead to the deterioration in home values, and the associated mortgage securities. The idea that making more credit available to an economic system whose members are already drowning in debt seems to leave something to be desired as to this strategy’s future efficacy and effectiveness.
Because of the immense magnitude and pervasiveness of this financial crisis, it is likely that $700 billion will not be sufficient to successfully address this problem because the dollar value is insufficient, and its focus is incomplete. The other aspect which must be addressed is how to provide relief to an overly indebted population who cannot adequately service its debt, and how to do it equitably so that those who have acted prudently do not feel penalized for their more prudent financial behavior.
From my perspective the inevitable public policy which will arise will be monetizing the debt, and creating enough inflation to diminish the real value of the existing debt. This appears the only real option if the global financial system will not collapse in a shambles. This would be the case where the number of losers is maximized, and a result would arise from either an immensely stupid public policy decision, or a monumental geopolitical miscalculation. My inclination is to believe that because the vested interests are at stake of so many who truly are mentally sharp, as well as business and worldly-wise, the inflating option will be the direction we find ourselves going in. Given the monetary and fiscal policy apparatus, mechanisms, and policy maker predispositions, this seems the most probable outcome.
The next step in this would be to more directly address the personal solvency issues. This is a bitter pill to swallow, but this would be a natural consequence of the imprudent financial behaviors on the scale we have witnessed over many years. There are many creative ways in which this could be done. I would think, however, that a policy this is bold, and demonstrably decisive would be what is really required to breathe life back into the system. The follow-up, if we were to really correct the error of our ways would be to put in place regulations as well as financial education, training, and counseling programs, and a rethinking of our values, as to not get ourselves, globally, back into these circumstances.
The credit markets are the lifeblood of a healthy functioning global economy. This financial crisis has resulted in a “freezing up” of the credit markets. Despite Central Banks flooding these markets with access to funds, the credit markets had remained frozen. The ostensible reason is that there is an underlying fear of institutional insolvency arising from exposure to toxic assets on their balance sheets. Because of the complexity of the financial structure of these assets, valuation becomes, more or less, conjecture. At the very least there is an asymmetric knowledge regarding the real quality of these assets. Probably, however, this even overstates the value assessment of these assets because, apparently, even the holders of these assets have exercised poor judgment regarding their value.
A more nefarious explanation as the why the credit markets continue to remain frozen after hundreds of billions of dollars have been injected into the system, could be a “money cartel strategy”. In this case, the fear generated by this credit crisis provides great cover for the institutional withholding of credit. The resulting worsening of financial market conditions result in more institutional and corporate failures and an increased availability of distressed asset sales for those who have access to capital.
Whichever explanation may be partially, or wholly, representative, the recently passed Paulson Plan is intended, at least at face value, to address the frozen credit market conditions by alleviating the institutional solvency concerns.
Unfortunately, as the point has been made by Roubini, and others, this only partially addresses the real problem which is the crushing personal debt burden. This is an underlying weak point which has lead to the deterioration in home values, and the associated mortgage securities. The idea that making more credit available to an economic system whose members are already drowning in debt seems to leave something to be desired as to this strategy’s future efficacy and effectiveness.
Because of the immense magnitude and pervasiveness of this financial crisis, it is likely that $700 billion will not be sufficient to successfully address this problem because the dollar value is insufficient, and its focus is incomplete. The other aspect which must be addressed is how to provide relief to an overly indebted population who cannot adequately service its debt, and how to do it equitably so that those who have acted prudently do not feel penalized for their more prudent financial behavior.
From my perspective the inevitable public policy which will arise will be monetizing the debt, and creating enough inflation to diminish the real value of the existing debt. This appears the only real option if the global financial system will not collapse in a shambles. This would be the case where the number of losers is maximized, and a result would arise from either an immensely stupid public policy decision, or a monumental geopolitical miscalculation. My inclination is to believe that because the vested interests are at stake of so many who truly are mentally sharp, as well as business and worldly-wise, the inflating option will be the direction we find ourselves going in. Given the monetary and fiscal policy apparatus, mechanisms, and policy maker predispositions, this seems the most probable outcome.
The next step in this would be to more directly address the personal solvency issues. This is a bitter pill to swallow, but this would be a natural consequence of the imprudent financial behaviors on the scale we have witnessed over many years. There are many creative ways in which this could be done. I would think, however, that a policy this is bold, and demonstrably decisive would be what is really required to breathe life back into the system. The follow-up, if we were to really correct the error of our ways would be to put in place regulations as well as financial education, training, and counseling programs, and a rethinking of our values, as to not get ourselves, globally, back into these circumstances.
Sunday, September 21, 2008
Mega Bailout
For a financial crisis of the monumental proportions now officially acknowledged to exist, the thought that a well thought out “solution” can be cobbled together in the time period of a week or so, has more of the hallmarks of an act of desperation rather than of sound public policy. Though it may be a needed response, the probability of success is anything, if not unclear. Moreover, the ramifications of the indirect effects, let alone the direct effects would require, from a more prudent perspective, some more in depth analysis before committing a potential $700 billion to this end. It is tempting and, at least temporarily, reassuring, judging by the market’s response to such a sketchy proposal, to believe that throwing a massive amount of money at this problem will make it go away. There are many unanswered questions.
Some observations, thoughts, and questions are:
In billions of $s:
AIG Bailout $85
Fannie-Freddie Rescue $200
New Bailout Proposal $700
Next $??
It looks like we're talking some pretty big money. We already depend upon about $65 billion per month being loaned to the U.S. to continue operations from foreign sources. Essentially, the U.S. was already insolvent before this latest bailout proposal. It is difficult to see how the U.S. dollar won't be adversely affected. The actions of the Government seem to lend credence to the idea that the "ultimate" solution will be to "monetize" debt. This would be a very inflationary factor.
How long will foreign sources continue to lend to the U.S. under assumptions of high credit worthiness. The U.S. is no longer considered the best credit risk in the world by some rating agencies. This may push the cost of continuing to finance U.S. government operations with foreign capital higher. Control of the U.S. economic and financial future has been effectively transferred to foreign sources of capital.
If this new bailout entity is to purchase toxic assets from banking institutions, how are these assets to be valued if dubious models and assumptions came up with spurious results to begin with, what model and assumptions are now to be used to assure the use of public funds is not directed towards supporting fictitious valuations? Moreover, if the capital requirements of institutions holding these assets requires raising more capital now, presumably the thinking is that by taking these assets off the balances sheets if these financial institutions will allow them to more easily raise capital. Even is this were true, if would seem that with the U.S. Governments need to raise capital to fund these bailouts, and quasi-bailouts, with the entry of institutions also entering the capital markets to recapitalize, might there be some degree of competition for funds and a “crowding out” effect? If so, wouldn’t this push up the cost of capital and put a additional damper on economic growth?
The manic response of the markets to a very sketchy solution to an enormous problem defies a rational context of financial analysis. The events of the last several weeks demonstrate how greatly sentiment, and the absence of sound thinking, appears to be driving market responses.
Some observations, thoughts, and questions are:
In billions of $s:
AIG Bailout $85
Fannie-Freddie Rescue $200
New Bailout Proposal $700
Next $??
It looks like we're talking some pretty big money. We already depend upon about $65 billion per month being loaned to the U.S. to continue operations from foreign sources. Essentially, the U.S. was already insolvent before this latest bailout proposal. It is difficult to see how the U.S. dollar won't be adversely affected. The actions of the Government seem to lend credence to the idea that the "ultimate" solution will be to "monetize" debt. This would be a very inflationary factor.
How long will foreign sources continue to lend to the U.S. under assumptions of high credit worthiness. The U.S. is no longer considered the best credit risk in the world by some rating agencies. This may push the cost of continuing to finance U.S. government operations with foreign capital higher. Control of the U.S. economic and financial future has been effectively transferred to foreign sources of capital.
If this new bailout entity is to purchase toxic assets from banking institutions, how are these assets to be valued if dubious models and assumptions came up with spurious results to begin with, what model and assumptions are now to be used to assure the use of public funds is not directed towards supporting fictitious valuations? Moreover, if the capital requirements of institutions holding these assets requires raising more capital now, presumably the thinking is that by taking these assets off the balances sheets if these financial institutions will allow them to more easily raise capital. Even is this were true, if would seem that with the U.S. Governments need to raise capital to fund these bailouts, and quasi-bailouts, with the entry of institutions also entering the capital markets to recapitalize, might there be some degree of competition for funds and a “crowding out” effect? If so, wouldn’t this push up the cost of capital and put a additional damper on economic growth?
The manic response of the markets to a very sketchy solution to an enormous problem defies a rational context of financial analysis. The events of the last several weeks demonstrate how greatly sentiment, and the absence of sound thinking, appears to be driving market responses.
Tuesday, September 09, 2008
Russia
The recent episode of Russia's response to Georgia's military intervention in South Ossetia, and the response by the West just happened to occur about the time of my initial visit To Russia. Needless to say, despite having invested positions in Russia, many of my perceptions had been formed from the context of the cold war rhetoric of the past, current geopolitical rivalries, and whatever books and articles I could assimilate about the region, including an excellent one by the eminent scholar Marshall Goldman, Petrostate: Putin, Power, and the New Russia. I could not help but to have some trepidation about going to Russia during this time.
From a professional perpective, while in Russia, I had the good fortune to be able to meet and talk with people in Russia'a emerging financial planning profession; meet a well respected economist, an oil & energy analyst, an asset manager, and a managing director of Troika Dialog, a Russian investment bank; perhaps equivalent to a Russian Goldman Sachs. Additional meetings with the Lukoil State Pension Fund rounded out the opportunity to learn about, and understand better Russians, and their current political and economic environment.
From a personal perspective, I had the opportunity to have my education about Russian history deepened by at least half a dozen native guides, and visits to Russian cultural and arts venues. Looking back at approximately the past 100 years in Russia's history, I could not help being extremely impressed at the intelligence, resilience, and strength of the Russian people. Having gone through two revolutions taking it from a Tsarist empire to the communist country of the Soviet Union, two world wars during which in the Second World War estimates of up to 27 million Russian people died, including around 2 million in St. Petersburg alone, watching the communist state dissolve and re-emerge into a rudimentary democracy, and having it crumble economically around 10 years later, only to have it re-emerge as a economic, and strategic, geopolitical power on the world stage represents a remarkable testiment to the human spirit of resilience.
What also became apparent during my visit is how poorly it seems Russia and the West understand one another, as well as the fears generated by the threat of disturbing the global status quo.
As an investment advisor, my experience suggests to me that the recent decline in value in the Russian markets may be seriously undervaluing the investment potential of an emerging economic power that appears to be destined for an increasingly strong role in global affairs. This is not to imply that the risks are negligible with respect to these investments. Looking, however, at some of the fundamentals, such as Russia's extremely high literacy rate, a vast need for infrastructure development, the need to economically uplift the majority of Russia's population to an emerging middle class, and Russia's vast natural resource and energy assets, suggests a huge potential over the next 10-15 years.
Unless politicians allow themselves to become locked into a cycle of escalating adversarial rhetoric, increasing the possibility of misjudgement and miscalculation, Russia and the West will likely work out their issues into a new balance of power arrangement. This will likely not be a clearly delineated point, but rather an ongoing process with contributions from other major global players such as China. If this perpective is correct, the investment potential outcome may well warrant the assumption of some degree of the risk in these positions. At present, in particular, this period of crisis and declining Russian asset values may represent an opportunity to secure a piece of Russia's future prosperity.
From a professional perpective, while in Russia, I had the good fortune to be able to meet and talk with people in Russia'a emerging financial planning profession; meet a well respected economist, an oil & energy analyst, an asset manager, and a managing director of Troika Dialog, a Russian investment bank; perhaps equivalent to a Russian Goldman Sachs. Additional meetings with the Lukoil State Pension Fund rounded out the opportunity to learn about, and understand better Russians, and their current political and economic environment.
From a personal perspective, I had the opportunity to have my education about Russian history deepened by at least half a dozen native guides, and visits to Russian cultural and arts venues. Looking back at approximately the past 100 years in Russia's history, I could not help being extremely impressed at the intelligence, resilience, and strength of the Russian people. Having gone through two revolutions taking it from a Tsarist empire to the communist country of the Soviet Union, two world wars during which in the Second World War estimates of up to 27 million Russian people died, including around 2 million in St. Petersburg alone, watching the communist state dissolve and re-emerge into a rudimentary democracy, and having it crumble economically around 10 years later, only to have it re-emerge as a economic, and strategic, geopolitical power on the world stage represents a remarkable testiment to the human spirit of resilience.
What also became apparent during my visit is how poorly it seems Russia and the West understand one another, as well as the fears generated by the threat of disturbing the global status quo.
As an investment advisor, my experience suggests to me that the recent decline in value in the Russian markets may be seriously undervaluing the investment potential of an emerging economic power that appears to be destined for an increasingly strong role in global affairs. This is not to imply that the risks are negligible with respect to these investments. Looking, however, at some of the fundamentals, such as Russia's extremely high literacy rate, a vast need for infrastructure development, the need to economically uplift the majority of Russia's population to an emerging middle class, and Russia's vast natural resource and energy assets, suggests a huge potential over the next 10-15 years.
Unless politicians allow themselves to become locked into a cycle of escalating adversarial rhetoric, increasing the possibility of misjudgement and miscalculation, Russia and the West will likely work out their issues into a new balance of power arrangement. This will likely not be a clearly delineated point, but rather an ongoing process with contributions from other major global players such as China. If this perpective is correct, the investment potential outcome may well warrant the assumption of some degree of the risk in these positions. At present, in particular, this period of crisis and declining Russian asset values may represent an opportunity to secure a piece of Russia's future prosperity.
Friday, June 20, 2008
More Balderdash!
Yesterday the media reported that China was going to increase oil prices by approximately 18% by reducing subsidies. This news was generally received by the investment community as a positive with regard to reducing the global price of oil. The price of oil dropped substantially on global markets. Presumably, the thinking, what little of it that there was, was that by increasing the price of oil Chinese consumers paid, a reduction in overall demand would be created. As a consequence, the overall supply, relative to this demand would increase, and global prices would drop.
The amazing part about this event is how well it illustrates the level of shallow thinking and the consequent behavioral response. Modern financial theory, increasingly being debunked by real life events, attributes some greater overall knowledge of incorporating all known information into aggregate market response with respect to efficient disclosure of asset valuations. This most recent event, however, is more representative of how poorly markets incorporate and reflect information into asset prices. Consequently, it is one more example of how inefficiently markets reflect appropriate valuation.
Even a superficial follower of the Chinese financial and economic system would know that China is facing a serious inflation problem. At the same time, because of its uneven distribution of economic development, it also has millions of people it needs to keep productively employed. The problem faced by China, and a good part of the rest of the world, is containing inflation while, at the same time, maintaining reasonably strong economic growth. It is difficult to see how the new Chinese policy of increased oil prices would contain inflation.
A more reasonable expectation is that the response to increased oil prices will be to pass the added cost along to the end consumers. The upward wage pressures China was already experiencing is likely to be increased in response to a higher income need among its workers. A later consequence would likely be to see the price of Chinese exports increase. Since much of the rest of the world is hooked on Chinese goods, it would be reasonable to see increased inflationary pressure in those countries importing Chinese goods. The United States and Europe are large importers of Chinese goods. As a consequence, we can expect to see increasing inflationary pressure in these regions arising from this event.
While there has been increasing pressure on China to strengthen its currency vis a vis the US dollar, this event would suggest that one way to try to contain the Chinese inflationary factor would be to keep the US dollar stronger vis a vis China's currency in order to retain purchasing power. At the same time, China has huge US currency reserves, and oil is traded primarily in US dollars on global markets. This means that China stabilizes its purchasing power of oil, reduces political policy pressure to strengthen its currency relative to the US dollar, and preserves a sustainable core rate of economic growth. As usual, this appears to be a masterful, strategically thoughtful Chinese policy move.
The amazing part about this event is how well it illustrates the level of shallow thinking and the consequent behavioral response. Modern financial theory, increasingly being debunked by real life events, attributes some greater overall knowledge of incorporating all known information into aggregate market response with respect to efficient disclosure of asset valuations. This most recent event, however, is more representative of how poorly markets incorporate and reflect information into asset prices. Consequently, it is one more example of how inefficiently markets reflect appropriate valuation.
Even a superficial follower of the Chinese financial and economic system would know that China is facing a serious inflation problem. At the same time, because of its uneven distribution of economic development, it also has millions of people it needs to keep productively employed. The problem faced by China, and a good part of the rest of the world, is containing inflation while, at the same time, maintaining reasonably strong economic growth. It is difficult to see how the new Chinese policy of increased oil prices would contain inflation.
A more reasonable expectation is that the response to increased oil prices will be to pass the added cost along to the end consumers. The upward wage pressures China was already experiencing is likely to be increased in response to a higher income need among its workers. A later consequence would likely be to see the price of Chinese exports increase. Since much of the rest of the world is hooked on Chinese goods, it would be reasonable to see increased inflationary pressure in those countries importing Chinese goods. The United States and Europe are large importers of Chinese goods. As a consequence, we can expect to see increasing inflationary pressure in these regions arising from this event.
While there has been increasing pressure on China to strengthen its currency vis a vis the US dollar, this event would suggest that one way to try to contain the Chinese inflationary factor would be to keep the US dollar stronger vis a vis China's currency in order to retain purchasing power. At the same time, China has huge US currency reserves, and oil is traded primarily in US dollars on global markets. This means that China stabilizes its purchasing power of oil, reduces political policy pressure to strengthen its currency relative to the US dollar, and preserves a sustainable core rate of economic growth. As usual, this appears to be a masterful, strategically thoughtful Chinese policy move.
Sunday, January 27, 2008
Economic Stimulus Plan?
The current stimulus plan in just more ineffectual arm waving. Whether it is a rebate of $600, $1,200, or $5,000, the current debt problems, both institutional and personal, suggest the money has already been spent.
I believe the current economic stimulus plan being proposed is not any more than political window dressing in response to public clamor. The idea that putting $600-$1,200 in the hands of an already extremely indebted consumer to go out and purchase more would be ludicrous, if it were not so tragic. It perpetuates the idea that economic growth derived primarily from growing disposable consumption can be the basis of a healthy and sustainable economic system.The true values from which real wealth is created, which were esteemed ideals of founders of the United States are thrift, hard work, and reinvestment into productive assets.Anyone looking for a quick fix and easy solution to the country’s economic ills needs to sober up. Politicians and worn out economic theories will not provide the solution. If there is a long term fix it will not come in the form of tax cuts and rebates to stimulate spending. It will come from a public policy which focuses on rebuilding the productive and innovative capacities, and, consequently, the competitiveness of the nation. This means a public policy directed towards rebuilding infrastructure and a commitment to funding the development of more minds capable of ingenuity and innovation, namely cutting edge education. It also means a shift from a consumption based society driving economic growth to saving and investment driven economic growth model.The alternative, as we can now see happening, is a selling off of the assets of the United States and becoming a people subservient to the economic and political interests of other nations.
I believe the current economic stimulus plan being proposed is not any more than political window dressing in response to public clamor. The idea that putting $600-$1,200 in the hands of an already extremely indebted consumer to go out and purchase more would be ludicrous, if it were not so tragic. It perpetuates the idea that economic growth derived primarily from growing disposable consumption can be the basis of a healthy and sustainable economic system.The true values from which real wealth is created, which were esteemed ideals of founders of the United States are thrift, hard work, and reinvestment into productive assets.Anyone looking for a quick fix and easy solution to the country’s economic ills needs to sober up. Politicians and worn out economic theories will not provide the solution. If there is a long term fix it will not come in the form of tax cuts and rebates to stimulate spending. It will come from a public policy which focuses on rebuilding the productive and innovative capacities, and, consequently, the competitiveness of the nation. This means a public policy directed towards rebuilding infrastructure and a commitment to funding the development of more minds capable of ingenuity and innovation, namely cutting edge education. It also means a shift from a consumption based society driving economic growth to saving and investment driven economic growth model.The alternative, as we can now see happening, is a selling off of the assets of the United States and becoming a people subservient to the economic and political interests of other nations.
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