Sunday, September 21, 2008

Mega Bailout

For a financial crisis of the monumental proportions now officially acknowledged to exist, the thought that a well thought out “solution” can be cobbled together in the time period of a week or so, has more of the hallmarks of an act of desperation rather than of sound public policy. Though it may be a needed response, the probability of success is anything, if not unclear. Moreover, the ramifications of the indirect effects, let alone the direct effects would require, from a more prudent perspective, some more in depth analysis before committing a potential $700 billion to this end. It is tempting and, at least temporarily, reassuring, judging by the market’s response to such a sketchy proposal, to believe that throwing a massive amount of money at this problem will make it go away. There are many unanswered questions.

Some observations, thoughts, and questions are:

In billions of $s:
AIG Bailout $85
Fannie-Freddie Rescue $200
New Bailout Proposal $700
Next $??

It looks like we're talking some pretty big money. We already depend upon about $65 billion per month being loaned to the U.S. to continue operations from foreign sources. Essentially, the U.S. was already insolvent before this latest bailout proposal. It is difficult to see how the U.S. dollar won't be adversely affected. The actions of the Government seem to lend credence to the idea that the "ultimate" solution will be to "monetize" debt. This would be a very inflationary factor.

How long will foreign sources continue to lend to the U.S. under assumptions of high credit worthiness. The U.S. is no longer considered the best credit risk in the world by some rating agencies. This may push the cost of continuing to finance U.S. government operations with foreign capital higher. Control of the U.S. economic and financial future has been effectively transferred to foreign sources of capital.

If this new bailout entity is to purchase toxic assets from banking institutions, how are these assets to be valued if dubious models and assumptions came up with spurious results to begin with, what model and assumptions are now to be used to assure the use of public funds is not directed towards supporting fictitious valuations? Moreover, if the capital requirements of institutions holding these assets requires raising more capital now, presumably the thinking is that by taking these assets off the balances sheets if these financial institutions will allow them to more easily raise capital. Even is this were true, if would seem that with the U.S. Governments need to raise capital to fund these bailouts, and quasi-bailouts, with the entry of institutions also entering the capital markets to recapitalize, might there be some degree of competition for funds and a “crowding out” effect? If so, wouldn’t this push up the cost of capital and put a additional damper on economic growth?

The manic response of the markets to a very sketchy solution to an enormous problem defies a rational context of financial analysis. The events of the last several weeks demonstrate how greatly sentiment, and the absence of sound thinking, appears to be driving market responses.

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